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Abstract6
Static and dynamic program analyses attempt to extract useful information on program’s behaviours.7
Static analysis uses an abstract model of programs to reason on their runtime behaviour without8
actually running them, while dynamic analysis reasons on a test set of real program executions. For9
this reason, the precision of static analysis is limited by the presence of false positives (executions10
allowed by the abstract model that cannot happen at runtime), while the precision of dynamic11
analysis is limited by the presence of false negatives (real executions that are not in the test set).12
Researchers have developed many analysis techniques and tools in the attempt to increase the13
precision of program verification. Software protection is an interesting scenario where programs need14
to be protected from adversaries that use program analysis to understand their inner working and15
then exploit this knowledge to perform some illicit actions. Program analysis plays a dual role in16
program verification and software protection: in program verification we want the analysis to be as17
precise as possible, while in software protection we want to degrade the results of analysis as much18
as possible. Indeed, in software protection researchers usually recur to a special class of program19
transformations, called code obfuscation, to modify a program in order to make it more difficult to20
analyse while preserving its intended functionality. In this setting, it is interesting to study how21
program transformations that preserve the intended behaviour of programs can affect the precision22
of both static and dynamic analysis. While some works have been done in order to formalise the23
efficiency of code obfuscation in degrading static analysis and in the possibility of transforming24
programs in order to avoid or increase false positives, less attention has been posed to formalise the25
relation between program transformations and false negatives in dynamic analysis. In this work we26
are setting the scene for a formal investigation of the syntactic and semantic program features that27
affect the presence of false negatives in dynamic analysis. We believe that this understanding would28
be useful for improving the precision of existing dynamic analysis tools and in the design of program29
transformations that complicate the dynamic analysis.30
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1 Introduction40
Program analysis refers, in general, to any examination of programs that attempts to extract41
useful information on program’s behaviours (semantics). As known from the Rice theorem,42
all nontrivial extensional properties of program’s semantics are undecidable in the general43
case. This means that any automated reasoning on software has to involve some kind of44
approximation. Programs can be analysed either statically or dynamically. Static program45
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analysis reasons about the behaviour of programs without actually running them. Typically,46
static analysis builds an abstract model that over-approximates the possible program’s47
behaviours to examine program properties. This guarantees soundness: what can be derived48
from the analysis of the abstract model holds also on the concrete execution of the program.49
The converse does not hold in general due to the presence of false positives: spurious50
behaviours allowed by the abstract model that do not correspond to any real program51
execution. Static analysis has proved its usefulness in many fields of computer science like52
in optimising compilers for producing efficient code, for automatic error detection and for53
the automatic verification of desired program properties (e.g., functional properties and54
security properties) [21]. Many different static analysis approaches exists, as for example55
model checking [7], deductive verification [33] and abstract interpretation [12]. In particular,56
abstract interpretation provides a formal framework for reasoning on behavioural program57
properties where many static analysis techniques can be formalised. In the rest of this58
paper we focus on those static analysis that can be formalised in the abstract interpretation59
framework. Dynamic program analyses, such as program testing [1], runtime monitoring60
and verification [4], consider an under-approximation of program behaviour as they focus61
their analysis on a specific subset of possible program executions. In this paper when we62
speak of dynamic analysis we mainly refer to program testing. Testing techniques start63
by concretely executing programs on an input set and the so obtained test set of concrete64
executions is inspected in order to reason on program’s behaviour (e.g., reveal failures or65
vulnerabilities). It is well known that dynamic analysis can precisely detect the presence of66
failures but cannot guarantee their absence, due to the presence of false negatives: concrete67
program behaviours that do not belong to the test set. There is a famous quote by Dijksta68
that states that “Program testing can be used to show the presence of bugs, but never to69
show their absence!”. Since it is not possible to guarantee the absence of failures we have70
to accept the fact that whenever we use software we incur in some risk. Software testing71
is widely used to reveal possible software failures, to reduce the risk related to the use of72
software and to increase the quality of software by deciding if the behaviour of software is73
acceptable in terms of reliability, safety, maintainability, security, and efficiency [1].74
Static analysis computes an over-approximation of program semantics, while dynamic75
analysis under-approximates program semantics. In both cases, we have a decidable evaluation76
of the semantic property of interest on an approximation of program semantics. For this77
reason what we can automatically conclude regarding the behavioural properties of programs78
has to take into account false positives for static analysis and false negatives for dynamic79
analysis. Static analysis is precise when it is complete (no false positives) and this relates to80
the well studied notion of completeness in abstract interpretation [12, 14, 23]. The intuition81
is that static analysis is complete when the details lost by the abstract model are not relevant82
for reasoning on the semantic property of interest. Dynamic analysis is precise when it is83
sound (no false negatives) and this happens when the executions in the test set exhibit all84
the behaviours of the program that are relevant with respect to the semantic property of85
interest. This means that the under-approximation of program semantics considered by the86
dynamic analysis allows us to precisely observe the behavioural property of interest. The87
essential problem with dynamic analysis is that it is impossible to test with all inputs since88
the input space is generally infinite. In this context, coverage criteria provide structured,89
practical ways to search the input space and to decide which input set to use. The rationale90
behind coverage criteria is to partition the input space in order to maximise the executions91
present in the tests set that are relevant for the analysis of the semantic property of interest.92
Coverage criteria are useful in supporting the automatic generation of input sets and in93
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providing useful rules for deciding when to terminate the generation of the test set [1].94
Program analysis has been originally developed for verifying the correctness of programs95
and researchers have put a great deal of effort in developing efficient and precise analysis96
techniques and tools that try to reduce false positives and false negatives as much as possible.97
Indeed, analysis precision relates to the ability of identifying failures and vulnerabilities that98
may lead to unexpected behaviours, or that may be exploited by an adversary for malicious99
purposes. For this reason the main goal of researchers has been to improve the precision and100
efficiency of both static and dynamic analysis tools.101
Software protection is another interesting scenario where program analysis plays a central102
role but in a dual way. Today, software and the assets embedded in it are constantly under103
attack. This is particularly critical for those software applications that run in an untrusted104
environment in a scenario known as MATE (Man-At-The-End) attacks. In this setting,105
attackers have full control over, and white-box access to, the software and the systems on106
which the software is running. Attackers can use a wide range of analysis tools such as107
disassemblers, code browsers, debuggers, emulators, instrumentation tools, fuzzers, symbolic108
execution engines, customised OS features, pattern matchers, etc. to inspect, analyse and109
alter software and its assets. In such scenarios, software protection becomes increasingly110
important to protect the assets, even against MATE attacks. For industry, in many cases the111
deployment of software-based defense techniques is crucial for the survival of their businesses112
and eco-systems. In the software protection scenario, program analysis can be used by113
adversaries to reverse engineer proprietary code and then illicitly reuse portions of the code114
or tamper with the code in some unauthorised way. Here, in order to protect the intellectual115
property and integrity of programs we have to force the analysis to be imprecise or so116
expensive to make it impractical for the adversary to mount an attack.117
To address this problem, researchers have developed software-based defense techniques,118
called code obfuscations, that transform programs with the explicit intent of complicating119
and degrading program analysis [9]. The idea of code obfuscation techniques is to transform120
a program into a functionally equivalent one that is more difficult (ideally impossible) for121
an analyst to understand. As well as for program analysis also for code obfuscation we122
have an important negative result from Barak et al. [3] that proves the impossibility of123
code obfuscation. Note that, this result states the impossibility of an ideal obfuscator that124
obfuscates every program by revealing only the properties that can be derived from its I/O125
semantics. Besides the negative result of Barak et al., in recent decades, we have seen a126
big effort in developing and implementing new and efficient obfuscation strategies [8]. Of127
course, these obfuscating techniques introduce a kind of practical obfuscators weakening the128
ideal obfuscator of Barak et al. in different ways, and which can be effectively used in real129
application protection in the market. For example, these obfuscators may work only for a130
certain class of programs, or may be able to hide only certain properties of programs (e.g.,131
control flow). Indeed, the attention on code obfuscation poses the need to deeply understand132
what we can obfuscate, namely which kind of program properties we can hide by inducing133
imprecision in their automatic analysis.134
A recent survey on the existing code obfuscation techniques shows the efficiency of135
code obfuscation in degrading the results of static analysis, while existing code obfuscation136
techniques turn out to be less effective against dynamic analysis [31]. Consider, for example,137
the well known control flow obfuscation based on the insertion of opaque predicates. An138
opaque predicate is a predicate whose constant value is known to the obfuscation, while it is139
difficult for the analyst to recognise such constant value [9]. Consider the program whose140
control flow graph is depicted on the left of Figure 1 where we have three blocks of sequential141
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Figure 1 Code obfuscation
instructions A,B and C executed in the order specified by the arrows A → B → C. Let142
OPT denote a true opaque predicate, namely a predicate that always evaluates to true. In143
the middle of Figure 1 we can see what happens to the control flow graph when we insert144
a true opaque predicate: block D has to be considered in the static analysis of the control145
flow even if it is never executed at runtime. Thus, A→ OPT → D → C is a false positive146
path added by the obfuscating transformation to the static analysis, while no imprecision is147
added to dynamic analysis since all real executions follow the path A → OPT → B → C.148
On the right of Figure 1 we have the control flow graph of the program obtained inserting149
an unknown opaque predicate. An unknown opaque predicate OP? is a predicate that150
sometimes evaluates to true and sometimes evaluates to false. These predicates are used151
to diversify program execution by inserting in the true and false branches sequences of152
instructions that are syntactically different but functionally equivalent (e.g. blocks B and153
B1) [9]. Observe that this transformation adds confusion to dynamic analysis: a dynamic154
analyser has now to consider more execution traces in order to cover all the paths of the155
control flow graph. Indeed, if the dynamic analysis observes only traces that follow the156
original path A→ OP? → B → C it may not be sound as it misses the traces that follow157
A→ OP? → B1 → C (false negative).158
The abstract interpretation framework has been used to formalise, prove and compare159
the efficiency of code obfuscation techniques in confusing static analysis [17, 25] and to160
derive strategies for the design of obfuscating techniques that hamper a specific analysis161
[19]. The general idea is that code obfuscation confuses static analysis by exploiting its162
conservative nature, and by modifying programs in order to increase its imprecision (adding163
false positives) while preserving the program intended behaviour. Observe that, in general,164
the imprecision added by these obfuscating transformations to confuse a static analyser is165
not able to confuse a dynamic attacker that cannot be deceived by false positives. This is166
the reason why common deobfuscation approaches often recur to dynamic analysis to reverse167
engineer obfuscated code [5, 10, 32, 34].168
It is clear that to complicate dynamic analysis we need to develop obfuscation techniques169
that exploit the Achilles heel of dynamic analysis, namely false negatives. In the literature,170
there are some defense techniques that focus on hampering dynamic analysis [2, 27, 28, 30].171
What is still missing is a general framework where it is possible to formalise, prove and discuss172
the efficiency of these transformations in complicating dynamic analysis in terms of the173
imprecision (false negatives) that they introduce. As discussed above the main challenge for174
dynamic analysis is the identification of a suitable input set for testing program’s behaviour.175
In order to automatically build a suitable input set, the analysts either design an input176
generation tool or an input recogniser tool. In both cases, they need a coverage criterion177
that defines the inputs to be considered and when to terminate the definition of the input178
set. Ideally, the coverage criterion is chosen in order to guarantee that the test set precisely179
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reveals the semantic property under analysis (no false negatives). However, to the best of180
our knowledge, there is no formal guarantee that a coverage criterion ensures the absence181
of false negatives with respect to a certain analysis. If hampering static analysis means to182
increase the presence of false positives, hampering dynamic analysis means to complicate183
the automatic construction of a suitable input set for a given coverage criterion. In order to184
formally reason on the effects that code obfuscation has on the precision of dynamic analysis185
it is important to develop a general framework, analogous to the one based on program186
semantics and abstract interpretation that formalises the relation between dynamic analysis187
and code obfuscation. Thus, we need to develop a framework where we can (1) formally188
specify the relation between the coverage criterion used and the semantic property that we189
are testing, (2) define when a program transformation complicates the construction of an190
input set that has to satisfy a given coverage criterion, (3) derive guidelines for the design of191
obfuscating transformations that hamper the dynamic analysis of a given program property.192
This formal investigation will allow us to better understand the potential and limits of code193
obfuscation against dynamic program analysis.194
In the following we provide a unifying view of static and dynamic program analysis and of195
the approaches that researchers use to tune the precision of these analysis. From this unifying196
overview it turns out that while the relation between the precision of static program analysis197
and program transformations has been widely studied, both in the software verification and198
in the software protection scenario, less attention has been posed to the formal investigation199
of the effects that code transformations have on the precision of program testing. We start200
to face this problem by showing how it is possible to formally compare and relate coverage201
criterion, semantic property under testing and false negatives for a specific class of program202
properties. This discussion leads us to the identification of important and interesting new203
research directions that would lead to the development of the above mentioned formal204
framework for reasoning about the effects of program transformations on the precision of205
dynamic analysis. We believe that this formal reasoning would find interesting applications206
both in the software verification and in the software protection scenario.207
Structure of the paper: In Section 2 we provide some basic notions. In Section 3 we208
discuss possible techniques for improving the precision of the analysis: Section 3.1 revise the209
existing and ongoing work in transforming properties and programs toward completeness of210
static analysis, while Section 3.2 provides the basis for a formal framework for reasoning on211
possible property and program transformations to achieve soundness in dynamic analysis,212
these are preliminary results some of which have been recently published in [18]. Section 4213
shows how the techniques used to improve analysis precision could be used in the software214
protection scenario to prove the efficiency of software protection techniques. The use of this215
formal reasoning for proving the efficiency of software protection techniques against static216
analysis is known, while it is novel for dynamic analysis. The paper ends with a discussion217
on the open research challenges that follow from this work.218
2 Preliminaries219
Given two sets S and T , we denote with ℘(S) the powerset of S, with S × T the Cartesian220
product of S and T , with S ⊂ T strict inclusion, with S ⊆ T inclusion, with S ⊆F T the221
fact that S is a finite subset of T . 〈C,≤C ,∨C ,∧C ,>C ,⊥C〉 denotes a complete lattice on222
the set C, with ordering ≤C , least upper bound (lub) ∨C , greatest lower bound (glb) ∧C ,223
greatest element (top) >C , and least element (bottom) ⊥C (the subscript C is omitted when224
the domain is clear from the context). Let C and D be complete lattices. Then, C m−→D and225
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C c−→D denote, respectively, the set and the type of all monotone and (Scott-)continuous226
functions from C to D. Recall that f ∈ C c−→D if and only if f preserves lub’s of (nonempty)227
chains if and only if f preserves lub’s of directed subsets. Let f : C → C be a function on a228
complete lattice C, we denote with lfp(f) the least fix-point, when it exists, of function f on229
C. The well-known Knaster-Tarski’s theorem states that any monotone operator f : C m−→C230
on a complete lattice C admits a least fix point. It is known that if f : C c−→C is continuous231
then lfp(f) = ∨i∈Nf i(⊥C), where, for any i ∈ N and x ∈ C, the i-th power of f in x is232
inductively defined as follows: f0(x) = x; f i+1(x) = f(f i(x)).233
Program Semantics: Let us consider the set Prog of possible programs and the set Σ of
possible program states. A program state s ∈ Σ provides a snapshot of the program and
memory content during the execution of the program. Given a program P we denote InitP
the set of its initial states. We use Σ∗ to denote the set of all finite and infinite sequences
or traces of states ranged over by σ. Given a trace σ ∈ Σ∗ we denote with σ0 ∈ Σ the first
element of sequence σ and with σf the final state of σ if σ is finite. Let τ ⊆ Σ× Σ denote
the transition relation between program states, thus (s, s′) ∈ τ means that state s′ can be
obtained from state s in one computational step. The trace semantics of a program P is





∣∣ (si, si+1) ∈ τ, σsi ∈ X }
The trace semantics of P is [[P ]] def= lfp(FP ) =
⋃
i∈N F iP (⊥C). Den[[P ]] denotes the denotational234
(finite) semantics of program P which abstracts away the history of the computation by235
observing only the input-output relation of finite traces: Den[[P ]] def= {σ ∈ Σ+ | ∃η ∈ [[P ]] :236
η0 = σ0, ηf = σf}.237
Concrete domains are collections of computational objects where the concrete semantics238
is computed, while abstract domains are collections of approximate objects, representing239
properties of concrete objects in a domain-like structure. It is possible to interpret the240
semantics of programs on abstract domains thus approximating the computation with respect241
to the property expressed by the abstract domain. The relation between concrete and242
abstract domains can be equivalently specified in terms of Galois connections (GC) or upper243
closure operators in the abstract interpretation framework [12, 13]. The two approaches244
are equivalent, modulo isomorphic representations of the domain object. A GC is a tuple245
(C,α, γ,A) where C is the concrete domain, A is the abstract domain and α : C → A246
and γ : A → C are respectively the abstraction and concretisation maps that give rise247
to an adjunction: ∀a ∈ A, c ∈ C : α(c) ≤A a ⇔ c ≤C γ(a). Abstract domains can be248
compared with respect to their relative degree of precision: if A1 and A2 are abstractions249
of a common concrete domain C, A1 is more precise than A2, denoted A1 v A2 when250
∀a2 ∈ A2,∃a1 ∈ A1 : γ1(a1) = γ2(a2), namely if γ2(A) ⊆ γ1(A). An upper closure operator251
on a complete lattice C is an operator ρ : C → C that is monotone, idempotent, and252
extensive (∀x ∈ C : x ≤C ρ(x)). Closures are uniquely determined by their fix-points ρ(C).253
If (C,α, γ,A) is a GC then ρ = γ ◦ α is the closure associated to A, such that ρ(C) is a254
complete lattice isomorphic to A. The closure γ ◦ α associated to the abstract domain A can255
be thought of as the logical meaning of A in C, since this is shared by any other abstract256
representation for the objects of A. Thus, the closure operator approach is convenient when257
reasoning about properties of abstract domains independently from the representation of258
their objects. We denote with uco(C) the set of upper closure operators over C. If C is a259
complete lattice then uco(C) is a complete lattice where closure are ordered with respect260
to their relative precision ρ1 v ρ2 ⇔ ρ2(C) ⊆ ρ1(C) which corresponds to the ordering of261
abstract domains.262
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The abstract semantics of a program P on the abstract domain ρ ∈ uco(℘(Σ∗)), denoted263
as [[P ]]ρ, is defined as the fix-point computation of function FρP : ρ(℘(Σ∗))→ ρ(℘(Σ∗)) where264
FρP
def= ρ ◦ FP ◦ ρ is the best correct approximation of function FP on the abstract domain265




P (⊥ρ(C)). Given the equivalence between GC266
and closures, the abstract semantics can be equivalently specified in terms of abstract traces267
in the corresponding abstract domain and in the following we denote the abstract semantics268
either with [[P ]]ρ or with [[P ]]A where (C,α, γ,A) is a GC and ρ = γ ◦ α.269
Equivalence Relations: Let R be a binary relation R ⊆ C ×C on a set C, given x, y ∈ C270
we denote with (x, y) ∈ R the fact that x is in relation R with y. R ⊆ C×C, is an equivalence271
relation if R is reflexive ∀x ∈ C : (x, x) ∈ R, symmetric ∀x, y ∈ C : (x, y) ∈ R ⇒ (y, x) ∈ R272
and transitive ∀x, y, z ∈ C : (x, y) ∈ R∧(y, z) ∈ R ⇒ (x, z) ∈ R. Given a set C equipped with273
an equivalence relation R, we consider for each element x ∈ C the subset [x]R of C containing274
all the elements of C in equivalence relation with x, i.e., [x]R = {y ∈ C | (x, y) ∈ R}. The sets275
[x]R are called equivalence classes of C wrt relation R and they induce a partition of the set C,276
namely ∀x, y ∈ C : [x]R = [y]R ∨ [x]R ∩ [y]R = ∅ and ∪{[x]R | x ∈ C} = C. The partition of277
C induced by the relation R is denoted by C/R. Let Eq(C) be the set of equivalence relations278
on the set C. The set of equivalence relations on C form a lattice 〈Eq(C),,uEq,tEq, id, top〉279
where id is the relation that distinguishes all the elements in C, top is the relation that cannot280
distinguish any element in C, and: R1  R2 iff R1 ⊆ R2 iff (x, y) ∈ R1 ⇒ (x, y) ∈ R2,281
R1 uEq R2 = R1 ∩R2, namely (x, y) ∈ R1 uEq R2 iff (x, y) ∈ R1 ∧ (x, y) ∈ R2; R1 tEq R2282
it is such that (x, y) ∈ R1 tEq R2 iff (x, y) ∈ R1 ∨ (x, y) ∈ R2. When R1  R2 we say that283
R1 is a refinement of R2. Given a subset S ⊆ C, we denote with R|S ∈ Eq(S) the restriction284
of relation R to the domain S.285
The relation between closure operators and equivalence relations has been studied in286
[29]. Each closure operator ρ ∈ uco(℘(C)) induces an equivalence relation Rρ ∈ Eq(C)287
where (x, y) ∈ Rρy iff ρ({x}) = ρ({y}) and viceversa, each equivalence relation R ∈ Eq(C)288
induces a closure operator ρR ∈ uco(℘(C)) where ρR({x}) = [x]R and ρR(X) =
⋃
x∈X [x]R.289
Of course, there are many closures that induce the same partition on traces and these290
closures carry additional information other than the underlying state partition, and this291
additional information that allows us to distinguish them is lost when looking at the induced292
partition. Indeed, it holds that given R ∈ Eq(C) the corresponding closure is such that293
ρR = u{ρ | Rρ = R}. The closures in uco(℘(C)) defined form a partition R ∈ Eq(C)294
are called partitioning and they identify a subset of uco(℘(C)): {ρR ∈ uco(℘(C)) | R ∈295
Eq(C)} ⊆ uco(℘(C)) [29].296
3 On the precision of program analysis297
As argued above program analysis has been originally developed for program verification,298
namely to ensure that programs will actually behave as expected. Besides the impossibility299
result of the Rice theorem, a multitude of analysis strategies have been proposed [21]. Indeed,300
by tuning the precision of the behavioural feature that we want to analyse it is possible301
to derive an analysable semantic property that, while loosing some details of program’s302
behaviour, may still be of practical interest [12, 14]. We are interested in semantic program303
properties, namely in properties that deal with the behaviour of programs, but the possibility304
of precisely analysing such properties depends also on the way in which programs are written.305
This means that there are programs that are easier to analyse than others with respect to a306
certain property [6]. Thus, program transformations that preserve the program’s intended307
functionality can affect the precision of the results of the same analysis on the original and308
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Figure 2 Abstract domain of Sign and Sign u Parity
transformed program.309
3.1 Static Analysis310
Precision in static program analysis means completeness, namely absence of false positives.311
This means that the noise introduced by the abstract model used for static program analysis312
does not introduce imprecision with respect to the property under analysis. Consider for313
example program P on the left of Figure 3 that, given an integer value a, returns its absolute314
value and it does it by adding some extra controls on the parity of variable a that have no315
effect on the result of computation1. The semantics of program P is:316
[[P ]] = {〈B1 : ⊥〉〈B2 : v1〉〈B4 : 2 ∗ v1 + 1〉〈B6 : 2 ∗ v1 + 1〉〈B7 : v1〉 | v1 ≥ 0} ∪317
{〈B1 : ⊥〉〈B3 : v1〉〈B4 : 2 ∗ v1〉〈B5 : 2 ∗ v1〉〈B7 : −v1〉 | v1 < 0}318
where 〈Bi, val〉 denotes the program state specifying the value val of variable a when entering319
block Bi and ⊥ denotes the undefined value. Assume that we are interested in the analysis on320
the abstract domain Sign depicted on the left of Figure 2. The Sign = {⊥,+0,−,>} abstract321
domain observes the sign of integer values and it is possible to define a GC between ℘(Z)322
and Sign where the abstract element +0 represents all positive values plus 0, the abstract323
element − represents all negative values, while > represents all integer values and ⊥ the324
emptyset. We denote with [[P ]]Sign ∈ ℘(Σ∗) the abstract interpretation of program P on the325
domain of Sign, where the values of variable a are interpreted on Sign.326
[[P ]]Sign = {〈B1 : ⊥〉〈B2 : +0〉〈B4 : +0〉〈B6 : +0〉〈B7 : +0〉,327
〈B1 : ⊥〉〈B2 : +0〉〈B4 : +0〉〈B5 : +0〉〈B7,−〉[false positive]328
〈B1 : ⊥〉〈B3 : −〉〈B4 : −〉〈B5 : −〉, 〈B7,+0〉329
〈B1 : ⊥〉〈B3 : −〉〈B4 : −〉〈B6 : −〉〈B7,−〉[false positive]}330
Each abstract trace corresponds to infinitely many concrete traces. So for example the331
abstract trace 〈B1 : ⊥〉〈B2 : +0〉〈B4 : +0〉〈B6 : +0〉〈B7 : +0〉 corresponds to the infinte set of332
concrete traces: {〈B1 : ⊥〉〈B2 : v1〉〈B4 : v2〉〈B6 : v3〉〈B7 : v3〉 | v1, v2, v3, v4 ≥ 0}. Observe333
that the second and fourth abstract traces are false positives that the abstract analysis has334
to consider but that cannot happen during computation. This is because the guard at B4335
1 The notation ba/2c refers to the integer division that rounds the non-integer results towards the lower
integer value.
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B1:
input a
if a ≥ 0:
B2:
then



























if a ≥ 0:
B2:
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Figure 3 P , Q and R are functionally equivalent programs
cannot be precisely evaluated on Sign and therefore both branches are seen as possible. This336
happens because the abstract domain of Sign is not complete for the analysis of program P337
and we have [[P ]] ⊂ [[P ]]Sign . This induces imprecision in the analysis on the abstract domain338
Sign that it is not able to conclude that the value of variable a is always positive at the end339
of execution. Let us denote with [[P ]](Bi) and with [[P ]]Sign(Bi) the possible values that can340
be assumed by variable a at block Bi when reasoning on the concrete and abstract semantics341
respectively. In this case we have that Sign([[P ]](B7)) = Sign({v | v ≥ 0}) = +0 and this is342
more precise than [[P ]]Sign(B7) = tSign{+0,−} = >.343
Transforming properties towards completeness344
It is well known that completeness is a domain property and that abstract domains can be345
refined in order to become complete for the analysis of a given program [23]. The idea is346
that in order to make the analysis complete we need to add to the abstract domain those347
elements that are necessary to reach completeness. In this case, if we consider the abstract348
domain that observes the sign and parity of integer values we reach completeness. Thus, let349
us consider the domain SignuParity depicted on the right of Figure 2, where even represents350
all the even integer values and odd represents all the odd integer values.351
[[P ]]SignuParity = {〈B1 : ⊥〉〈B2 : (+0, even)〉〈B4 : (+0, odd)〉〈B6 : (+0, odd)〉〈B7 : +0〉352
〈B1 : (+0,⊥)〉〈B2 : (+0, odd)〉〈B4 : (+0, odd)〉〈B6 : (+0, odd)〉〈B7 : +0〉353
〈B1 : (−,⊥)〉〈B3 : (−, even)〉〈B4 : (−, even)〉〈B5 : (−, even)〉〈B7 : +0〉354
〈B1 : (−,⊥)〉〈B3 : (−, odd)〉〈B4 : (−, even)〉〈B5 : (−, even)〉〈B7 : +0〉}355
As we can see all the abstract traces are able to precisely observe that variable a is positive at356
the end of the execution and that it can be either even or odd. Indeed, we have completeness357
with respect to the SignuParity property SignuParity([[P ]](B7)) = [[P ]]SignuParity(B7) = +0.358
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Thus, a possible way for tuning the precision of static analysis is to transform the property359
that we want to analyse in order to reach completeness, there exists a systematic methodology360
that allows us to add the minimal amount of elements to the abstract domain in order to361
make the analysis complete for a given program [23].362
Transforming programs towards completeness363
The way in which programs are written affects the precision of the analysis. For example we
can easily write a program functionally equivalent to P but for which the analysis on Sign is
complete. Consider, for example, program Q as the one in the middle of Figure 3, we have
that:
[[Q]] = {〈B1 : ⊥〉〈B2 : v〉〈B4 : v〉 | v ≥ 0} ∪ {〈B1 : ⊥〉〈B3 : v〉〈B4 : −v〉 | v < 0}
[[Q]]Sign = {〈B1 : ⊥〉〈B2 : +0〉〈B4 : +0〉, 〈B1 : ⊥〉〈B3 : −〉〈B4 : +0〉}
This makes it clear how the abstract computation loses information regarding the modulo of364
the value of variable a, while it precisely observes the positive value of a at the end of execution.365
Indeed, in this case we have that: Sign([[Q]](B7)) = Sign({v | v ≥ 0}) = +0 = [[Q]]Sign(B7).366
It is worth studying the possibility of transforming programs in order to make a certain367
analysis complete. In a recent work [6] the authors introduced the notions of complete368
clique C(P,A) and incomplete clique C̄(P,A) that represent the set of all programs that369
are functionally equivalent to P and for which the analysis on the abstract domain A is370
respectively complete and incomplete. They prove that there are infinitely many abstractions371
for which the systematic removal of false positives for all programs is impossible. Moreover,372
they observe that false positives are related to the evaluation of boolean predicates that the373
abstract domain is not able to evaluate precisely (as we have seen in our earlier example). The374
authors claim that their investigation together with the poof system in [24] should be used375
as a starting point to reason on a code refactoring strategy that aims at modifying a given376
program in order to gain precision with respect to a predefined analysis. Given an abstract377
domain A, the final goal would be to derive a program transformation TA : Prog → Prog that378
given a program P ∈ C̄(P,A) for which the analysis A is incomplete, namely A([[P ]]) 6= [[P ]]A,379
transforms it into a program T (P ) ∈ C(P,A) for which the analysis is complete, namely380
A([[P ]]) = [[P ]]A.381
These recent promising works suggest how to proceed in the investigation of program382
transformations as a mean for gaining precision in static program analysis.383
3.2 Dynamic Analysis384
Testing is typically used to discover failures (or bugs), namely an incorrect program behaviour385
with respect to the requirements or the description of the expected program behaviour.386
Precision in program testing is expressed in terms of soundness: the ideal situation where no387
false negatives are present. When speaking of failures, this happens when the executions388
considered in the test set exhibit at least one behaviour for each one of the failures present389
in the program. Indeed, when this happens, testing allows us to detect all the failures in the390
program. It is clear that the choice of the input set to use for testing is fundamental in order391
to minimise the number of false negatives. What we have just said holds when testing aims392
at detecting failures as well as for the analysis of any property of traces (as for example the393
order in which memory cells are accessed, the target of jumps, etc.). Let us denote with IP394
the input space of the possible input values needed to complete an execution of program395
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P under testing2. Dynamic analysis considers a finite subset of the input space, called the396
input set InSet ⊆F IP , that identifies the input values that are used for execution. The397
execution traces generated by the input set define the test set, which is the finite set of traces398
used by dynamic analysis to reason on program behaviour. Given an input value x ∈ IP we399
denote with P (x) ∈ [[P ]] the execution of program P when fed with input x.400
As argued above, the main source of imprecision in testing is that the number of potential401
inputs for most programs is so large as to be effectively infinite. Since we cannot test with402
all inputs, researchers typically recur to the use of coverage criteria in order to decide which403
test inputs to use. A coverage criterion C induces a partition on the input space and in order404
to minimise the false negatives the input set should contain at least one element for each405
class of the partition. In the left part of Figure 4 we consider a typical coverage criterion,406
called path coverage, for the testing of program Q in Figure 3. Path coverage criterion is407
satisfied when for each path in the control flow graph of the program there exists at least one408
execution in the test set that follows that path. When considering program Q it is immediate409
to derive from the coverage criterion the partition of the input space: the class of positive410
integer values (that follow the path B1 → B2 → B4) and the class of negatives integer values411
(that follow the path B1 → B3 → B4). In this case the coverage criterion is satisfied by every412
input set that contains at least one positive integer value and one negative integer value.413
Since it is the coverage criterion that determines the input set and therefore the executions414
that are considered by the dynamic analysis, it is very important to select a good coverage415
criterion. However, it is not clearly stated or formally defined what makes a coverage criterion416
good [1], and this may be one of the reasons why many coverage criteria have been developed417
by researchers. Generally speaking, there are some features that it is important to consider418
when speaking of coverage criterion such as:419
the difficulty of deriving the rules to partition the input space with respect to the coverage420
criterion;421
the difficulty of generating an input set that satisfies the coverage criterion, namely that422
contains at least one input for each one of the classes in which the input space has been423
partitioned;424
how well a test set that satisfies the coverage criterion guarantees the absence of false425
negatives.426
To the best of our knowledge there is no general framework that formalises the relation427
between coverage criterion, partition of the input space and false negatives in the dynamic428
analysis of a semantic program property. Indeed, while the soundness of dynamic analysis429
may not be possible in general, we think that it would be interesting to study the soundness430
of dynamic analysis of a program with respect to a specific semantic property (as usually431
done when reasoning about completeness in static analysis). We believe that this formal432
investigation would help in better understanding the cause of false negatives and would be433
useful in reducing them.434
3.2.1 Towards a formal framework for dynamic analysis435
We formalise the splitting of the input space induced by a coverage criterion C in terms of436
an equivalence relation RCI ∈ Eq(IP ), and this allows us to formally define when an input437
set satisfies a coverage criterion.438
2 In this work, for simplicity but with no loss of generality, we speak of input values while in the general
case we may need collections of values in order to complete an execution of the software under test.
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Figure 4 Path coverage criterion on program Q of Figure 3, and soundness conditions
I Definition 1. Given a program P , an input set InSet ⊆F IP and a coverage criterion439




We have seen this in Figure 4 when considering the partition induced in the input space442
of program Q and observing that an input set satisfies the path coverage criterion when it443
contains at least one positive and one negative integer value. When considering coverage444
criteria we need to take into account infeasible requirements: for example when considering445
coverage criteria related to the paths of the control flow graph we have to handle infeasible446
paths as it is not possible to define input values that follow these paths (as for example paths447
B1 → B2 → B4 → B5 → B7 and B1 → B3 → B4 → B5 → B7 of program P ). This is a448
known challenging problem in dynamic analysis and testing as the detection of infeasible test449
requirements is undecidable for most coverage criteria [1]. This means that some preliminary450
analysis is needed in order to ensure the feasibility of the coverage criteria, namely to ensure451
that it is possible to generate an input set that satisfies a given coverage criterion. Otherwise,452
we need to somehow quantify how much the input set satisfies the coverage criterion, for453
example considering the percentage of equivalence classes that are covered by the input set.454
In this work we do not address this problem and we assume the feasibility of the coverage455
criteria.456
Observe that the equivalence relation RCI ∈ Eq(IP ) naturally induces an equivalence457
relation on traces RC ∈ Eq([[P ]]) where (σ1, σ2) ∈ RC iff ∃x1, x2 ∈ IP : P (x1) = σ1,458
P (x2) = σ2 and (x1, x2) ∈ RCI . Thus, we can say that a given coverage criterion, and459
therefore any test set that satisfies that coverage criterion, can be associated to a partition460
of program trace semantics. Our idea is that the partition of the program trace semantics461
induced by the coverage criterion could be used to reason on the class of semantic program462
properties for which the coverage criterion can ensure soundness. To this end, we need to463
represent semantic program properties in a way that can be compared with partitions on464
traces.465
Properties of traces are naturally modelled as abstract domains, namely as closure466
operators in uco(℘(Σ∗)). A semantic property ρ ∈ uco(℘(Σ∗)) maps an execution trace467
(or a set of execution traces) to the minimal set of traces that cannot be distinguished468
by the considered property. Each closure operator ρ ∈ uco(℘(Σ∗)) induces an equivalence469
relation Rρ ∈ Eq(Σ∗): σ1Rρσ2 iff ρ({σ1}) = ρ({σ2}), where traces are grouped together470
if they are mapped in the same element by abstraction ρ. In the following, we model the471
properties of traces as equivalence relations over traces or equivalently as partitioning closures472
in uco(℘(Σ∗)), and we denote these properties as A ∈ Eq(Σ∗). According to [29] there is473
more than one closure that maps to the same equivalence relations, thus considering the474
partitions induced by closure operators corresponds to focusing on the set of partitioning475
closures (which is a proper subset of closure operators over ℘(Σ∗)). This allows us to express476
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properties of the single traces but not relational properties that have to take into account477
more than one trace. This means that we can use equivalence relations in Eq(Σ∗) to express478
properties such as: the order of successive accesses to memory, the order of execution of479
instructions, the location of the first instruction of a function, the target of jumps, function480
location, possible data values at certain program points, the presence of a bad states in the481
trace, and so on. These are properties of practical interest in dynamic program analysis.482
What we cannot express are properties on sets of traces, the so called hyper-properties,483
that express relational properties among traces, like non-interference. The extension of the484
framework to closures that are not partitioning is left as future work. This allows us to485
formally model the soundness of dynamic analysis.486
I Definition 2. Given a program P and a property A ∈ Eq(Σ∗), the dynamic analysis A487
on input set InSet ⊆F IP is sound, denoted InSet
s
 A(P ), if ∀[σ]A ∈ [[P ]]/A we have that488
[σ]A ∩ InSet 6= ∅.489
This precisely captures the fact that dynamic analysis needs to observe the different behaviours490
of the program with respect to the property of interest in order to be sound. Indeed, when491
considering a program P and a property A it is enough to observe a single trace in an492
equivalence class [σ]A ⊆ [[P ]] in order to observe how property A behaves in all the traces of493
program P that belong to that equivalence class. If we consider program Q in Figure 3 we494
have that in order to precisely observe the evolution of the sign property along the execution495
we have to consider at least one trace that follows the path B1 → B2 → B4 and one trace496
that follows the path B1 → B3 → B4 as depicted in Figure 4.497
Modelling program properties as equivalence relations makes it easy to compare them498
with the coverage criteria and to reason on soundness.499
I Theorem 3. Given a program P , a coverage criterion C, an input set InSet ⊆F IP and a500
property A ∈ Eq(Σ∗), we have that if RC  RA|[[P ]] and InSet |= C, then InSet
s
 A(P ).501
Proof. InSet |= C therefore ∀[x]RC ∈ IP /RC we have that InSet ∩ [x]RC 6= ∅. Since502
RC  A|[[P ]] we have that for each equivalence class [σ]RC there exists an equivalence class503
[σ]A|[[P ]] that [σ]RC ⊆ [σ]A|[[P ]] . This implies that for every [σ]A|[[P ]] ∈ [[P ]]/A we have that504
[σ]A|[[P ]] ∩ InSet 6= ∅ and therefore InSet
s
 A(P ). J505
In Figure 4 on the right we provide a graphical representation of the above theorem. Traces506
in Σ∗ exhibit different attributes with respect to property A and this is represented by the507
different shapes: circle, triangle, square and star. Trace partition is then represented by the508
thick lines that group together traces that are undistinguishable with respect to property509
A. Dotted lines are used to represent a trace partition induced by coverage criterion C on510
the traces of P and that ensures the absence of false negatives in the analysis. Indeed, from511
the graphical representation it is clear that when InSet |= C then InSet contains at least a512
trace for each equivalence class of RC , and this implies that it contains at least a trace for513
each one of the possible attributes (circle, triangle and square) that traces in [[P ]] can exhibit514
with respect to property A. This allows us to characterise the set of properties for which a515
given coverage criterion can ensure soundness.516
I Definition 4. Given a coverage criterion C on a program P , we define the set of properties517
Π(C) def= {A ∈ Eq(Σ∗) | RC  A|[[P ]]} that are coarsest than the equivalence relation induced518
by the coverage criterion.519
It follows that any input set that satisfies a coverage criterion C on a program P would lead520
to a sound dynamic analysis on any property in Π(C).521
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Figure 5 Comparing RC and A for soundness
I Corollary 5. Given a coverage criterion C on a program P , and input set InSet ⊆F IP522
such that InSet |= C, than ∀A ∈ Π(C) we have that InSet s A(P ).523
In Figure 5 we summarise the relation between coverage criteria and soundness of a particular524
program property. Given a program P , Figure 5 depicts the domain of equivalence relations525
over [[P ]] where id denotes the most fine equivalence relation that corresponds to the identity526
relation, ∀σ1, σ2 ∈ [[P ]] : (σ1, σ2) ∈ id iff σ1 = σ2, and top denotes the coarser equivalence527
relation that sees every trace as equivalent ∀σ1, σ2 ∈ [[P ]] it holds that (σ1, σ2) ∈ top. As528
stated in Theorem 3 whenever RC  A|[[P ]] then the coverage criterion C can be used to529
ensure soundness of the analysis of property A on program P . As stated by Corollary 5 a530
coverage criterion C can ensure soundness for all those properties in Π(C).531
Following our reasoning, the most natural coverage criterion for a given semantic property532
A is the one for which RC = A, namely the coverage criterion whose partition on states533
corresponds to the property under analysis. In the literature there exists many different534
coverage criteria and some of them turn out to be equivalent when compared with respect535
to the partition that they induce on the input space. It has been observed that all existing536
test coverage criteria can be formalised on four mathematical structures: input domains,537
graphs, logic expressions, and syntax descriptions (grammars) [1]. Even if these coverage538
criteria are not explicitly related to the properties being analysed they have probably been539
designed while having in mind the kind of properties of interest. For example, some of the540
most widely known coverage criteria are based on graph features and are typically used for541
the analysis of properties related to a graphical representation of programs, like control flow542
or data flow properties of code or variables that can be verified on the control flow graph of543
a program, or function calls that can be verified on the call graph or a program, and so on.544
For example code coverage requires the execution of all the basic blocks of a control flow545
graph and wants to ensure that all the reachable instructions of a program are considered at546
least in one execution of the test set.547
What we have stated so far allows us to begin to answer the question regarding how548
well the coverage criterion behaves with respect to the analysis of a given semantic property549
(when this can be modelled as a partitioning closure on the powerset of program traces). The550
design of an automatic or systematic strategy for the generation of an input set that covers551
a given coverage criterion remains an open challenge that deserves further investigation.552
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Transforming properties towards soundness553
There are two questions that naturally arise from our reasoning and that would be interesting554
to investigate regarding the systematic transformation of the property under analysis or the555
coverage criterion towards soundness.556
1. Consider a program P , a coverage criterion C that induces a partition RC ∈ Eq([[P ]]) on557
the traces of program P and a trace property A1 for which the coverage criterion C cannot558
ensure soundness. We wonder if it is possible to design a systematic transformation of559
property A1 that, by grouping some of its equivalence classes, returns a trace property560
for which we have soundness when C is satisfied by the input set. It would be interesting561
to understand when this transformation is possible without reaching top, i.e., while still562
being able to distinguish trace properties. This is depicted by the arrow labeled with T1563
in the upper part of Figure 5.564
2. Consider a program P , a coverage criterion C1 that induces a partition RC1 ∈ Eq([[P ]]) on565
the traces of program P and a trace property A for which the coverage criterion C1 cannot566
ensure soundness. We wonder if it is possible to design a systematic transformation of567
RC1 that, by further splitting its equivalence classes, returns a partition of the program568
traces, and therefore a coverage criterion, that when satisfied by the input set ensures569
soundness for the analysis of property A. In this case it is interesting to investigate when570
this refinement is possible without ending up with the identity relation, namely without571
collapsing to id where all program traces needs to be considered for coverage. This is572
depicted by the arrow labeled with T2 in the bottom part of Figure 5.573
Transforming programs towards soundness574
As for static analysis also for dynamic analysis the way in which programs are written575
influences the precision of the analysis either because they expand the input set that satisfies576
a given coverage criterion, thus requiring the observation of more program runs, or because577
they complicate the automatic/systematic extraction of an input set that satisfies a given578
coverage criterion. We focus on the first case since we still have to formally investigate the579
extraction of input sets for a given coverage criterion, namely the input generation and input580
recogniser procedure.581
Let us consider program R on the right of Figure 3 that computes the absolute value of582
an integer value and does it by adding some extra control on the range of the input integer583
value in order to proceed with the computation of the modulo in some syntactically different,584
but semantically equivalent ways. Indeed, in this example it is easy to observe that blocks B4585
and B5 are equivalent, but we can think about more sophisticated ways to write equivalent586
code in such a way that it would be difficult for the analyst to automatically recognise that587
they are equivalent. If we consider again the path coverage criterion we can observe that in588
order to cover the control flow graph of program R we need at least three input values: a589
negative integer, a positive integer smaller than 100 and a positive integer greater than or590
equal to 100. Of course what is done in block B2 can be replicated many times, as far as we591
are able to write blocks that are syntactically different but semantically equivalent to B4 or592
B3. According to our framework, path coverage is more complicated to reach on program593
R than on program Q. Indeed, in this case, every input set that satisfies path coverage for594
program R also satisfies path coverage for program Q while the converse does not hold in595
general. This reasoning is limited to the amount of traces that we need to satisfy a given596
coverage criterion and does not take into account the difficulty of generating such traces. Of597
course both aspects would need to be taken into account by our formal framework.598
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Moreover, as done for static analysis in [6], it would be interesting to define the notions
of sound clique S(P, InSet,A) and of unsound clique S̄(P, InSet,A) that represent the sets
of all programs that are functionally equivalent to P and for which the dynamic analysis of
property A on input set InSet ⊆ IP is respectively sound and not sound:
S(P, InSet,A) def= {Q ∈ Prog | Den([[P ]]) = Den([[Q]]), InSet s A(P )}
S̄(P, InSet,A) def= {Q ∈ Prog | Den([[P ]]) = Den([[Q]]), Q 6∈ S(P, InSet,A)}
We plan to study the existence of transformations from S̄(P, InSet,A) to S(P, InSet,A) in599
order to rewrite a program toward soundness. It is interesting to understand which are the600
properties for which this can be done in a systematic way and what is the key for reaching601
soundness. The intuition is that for reaching soundness with respect to a property A on an602
input set InSet we should choose programs whose variations of property A are all considered603
by the input set as stated in Theorem 3. Thus, in general, if we reduce variations of the604
considered property by merging traces that are functionally equivalent even if they have605
diversified A properties we would probably facilitate soundness. This needs to be formally606
understood, proved and validated on some existing dynamic analysis.607
4 Software protection: a new perspective608
In the software protection scenario we are interested in preventing program analysis while609
preserving the intended behaviour of programs. To face this problem Collberg et al. [9]610
introduced the notion of code obfuscation: program transformations designed with the explicit611
intent of complicating and degrading program analysis while preserving program functionality.612
Few years later Barak et al. [3] proved that it is not possible to obfuscate everything but613
the input-output behaviour for all programs with limited penalty in performances. However,614
it is possible to relax some of the requirements of Barak et al. and design obfuscating615
techniques that are able to complicate certain analysis of programs. This is witnessed by the616
great amount of obfuscation tools and techniques that researchers, both from academia and617
industry, have been developing in the last twenty years [8]. What it means for a program618
transformation to complicate program analysis is something that needs to be formally619
stated and proved when defining new obfuscating transformations. The extent to which an620
obfuscating technique complicates, and therefore protects, the analysis of certain program621
properties is referred to as potency of the obfuscation. A formal proof of the quality of622
obfuscation in terms of its potency is very important in order to compare the efficiency of623
different obfuscation techniques and in order to understand the degree of protection that they624
guarantee. Unfortunately, a unifying methodology for the quantitative evaluation of software625
protection techniques is still an open challenge, as witnessed by the recent Dagstuhl Seminar626
on this topic [20]. What we have are specific measurements done when new techniques are627
proposed, or formal proofs that reduce the analysis of obfuscated programs to well known628
complex analysis tasks (like alias analysis, shape analysis, etc.).629
In our framework, complicating program analysis means inducing imprecision in the630
results of the analysis of the obfuscated program with respect to the results of the analysis631
of the original program. This means that code obfuscation should induce false positives in632
static program analysis and false negatives in dynamic program analysis.633
4.1 Program transformations against static program analysis634
The abstract interpretation framework has been used to reason on the semantic properties635
that code obfuscation transformations are able to protect and the ones that they can still be636
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analysed on the obfuscated program. It has been observed that a program property expressed637
by an abstract domain A is obfuscated (protected) by an obfuscation O : Prog → Prog on638
a program P whenever [[P ]]A ≤A [[O(P )]]A, namely when the analysis A on the obfuscated639
program returns a less precise result with respect to the analysis of the same property on640
the original program P . The spurious information added to the analysis by the obfuscation641
is the noise that confuses the analyst, thus making the analysis more complicated. The642
relation between potency of code obfuscation and the notion of (in)completeness in abstract643
interpretation has been proven, as obfuscating a property means to induce incompleteness644
in its analysis [22]. So, for example, the insertion of a true opaque predicate OT (see the645
program in the middle of Figure 1) would confuse all those analyses that are not able to646
precisely evaluate such a predicate and have to consider both branches as possible. No647
confusion is added for those analyses that are able to precisely evaluate the opaque predicate648
and consider only the true branch as possible, namely those analyses that are complete for649
the evaluation of the predicate value. Following this idea, a formal framework based on650
program semantics and abstract interpretation has been developed, where it is possible to651
formally prove that a property is obfuscated by a given program transformation, compare652
the efficiency of different obfuscating techniques in protecting a given property, define a653
systematic strategy for the design of a code obfuscation technique for protecting a given654
program property [17, 19, 22, 25]. This semantic understanding of the effects that code655
obfuscation has on the semantics and semantic properties of programs as shown its usefulness656
also in the malware detection scenario where malware writers use code obfuscation to evade657
automatic detection [15, 16].658
Thus we can say that the effects of functionality preserving program transformations on659
program semantics and on the precision of the results of static analysis has been extensively660
studied and a mature formal framework has been provided [15, 16, 17, 19, 22, 25].661
4.2 Program transformations against dynamic program analysis662
To the best of our knowledge, the effects of functionality preserving program transformations663
on the precision of dynamic analysis have not been fully investigated yet. Following our664
reasoning, the general idea is that dynamic analysis is complicated by program transformations665
that induce false negatives while preserving program’s functionality. Let A ∈ Eq(Σ∗) denote666
a property of interest for dynamic analysis. Inducing false negatives for the analysis of667
a property A can be done by exploiting the partial observation of program’s executions668
innate in the test set, and thus adding traces that do not belong to the test set and have669
a different A property. Thus, the key for software protection against dynamic analysis is670
software diversification with respect to the property under analysis. The ideal obfuscation671
against the dynamic analysis of property A should specialise programs with respect to every672
input in such a way that every input exhibits a different behaviour for property A. Namely,673
an ideal obfuscation against A is a program transformation O : Prog → Prog such that674
∀σ1, σ2 ∈ [[O(P )]] we have that A(σ1) = A(σ2)⇔ σ1 = σ2. In this ideal situation in order675
to avoid false negatives the analyst should consider every possible execution trace of O(P )676
since each trace exhibits a different aspects of property A, so missing a trace would mean677
to miss such an aspect. This intuition is confirmed in a preliminary work in this direction678
where it is shown how diversification is the basis of existing software protection techniques679
against dynamic analysis [18]. This work provides a topological characterisation of the680
soundness of the dynamic analysis of properties expressed as equivalence relations (as we681
have done in Section 3.2.1). This formal characterisation is then used to define the notion of682
transformation potency for dynamic analysis.683
Gabbr i e l l i ’ s Fes t schr i f t
4:18 Towards a unifying framework for tuning analysis precision by program transformation
[[P ]]/A [[O(P )]]/A
O
Figure 6 Transformation Potency
I Definition 6. A functionality preserving program transformation O : Prog → Prog is684
potent for the analysis of A ∈ Eq(Σ∗) of program P if:685
∀σ1, σ2 ∈ [[O(P )]] : [σ1]A = [σ2]A, ∀ν1, ν2 ∈ [[P ]] : Den(ν1) = Den(σ1),Den(ν2) =686
Den(σ2) then [ν1]A = [ν2]A687
∃ν1, ν2 ∈ [[P ]] : [ν1]A = [ν2]A for which ∃σ1, σ2 ∈ [[O(P )]] : Den(ν1) = Den(σ1),Den(ν2) =688
Den(σ2) such that [σ1]A 6= [σ2]A689
Figure 6 provides a graphical representation of the notion of potency. On the left we have the690
traces of the original program P partitioned according to the equivalence relation A induced691
by the property of interest, while on the right we have the traces of the transformed program692
O(P ) partitioned according to A. Traces that are denotationally equivalent have the same693
shape (triangle, square, circle, oval), but different dimension since they are in general different694
traces. The first condition means that the traces of O(P ) that property A maps to the695
same equivalence class (circle and square), are denotationally equivalent to traces of P that696
property A maps to the same equivalence class. This means that what is grouped together697
by A on [[O(P )]] was grouped together by A on [[P ]], modulo the denotational equivalence698
of traces. The second condition requires that there are traces of P (triangle and star) that699
property A maps to the same equivalence class and whose denotationally equivalent traces in700
O(P ) are mapped by A to different equivalence classes. This means that a defense technique701
against dynamic analysis with respect to a property A is successful when it transforms a702
program into a functionally equivalent one for which property A is more diversified among703
execution traces. This implies that it is necessary to collect more execution traces in order704
for the analysis to be precise. At the limit we have an optimal defense technique when A705
varies at every execution trace.706
The above definition of transformation potency for dynamic analysis has been validated707
by modelling in the proposed framework some existing software defence strategies against708
dynamic analysis for the extraction of the control flow graph of programs like Range Dividers709
[2] and Gadget diversification [30]. In both cases it is possible to show that the proposed710
transformations complicate the dynamic extraction of the control flow graph by adding new711
diversified paths to the control flow graph, as stated in Definition 6. In the following we712
report a simple example from [18] that shows how the key for obfuscating properties of data713
values for dynamic analysis is diversification.714
I Example 7. Consider the following programs P and Q that compute the sum of natural715
numbers from x ≥ 0 to 49 (we assume that the inputs values for x are natural numbers).716




while x < 50
• o X = [0, 49] o
sum := sum + x;
x := x + 1;
Q
input x;
n : = select(N,x)
x := x * n;
sum := 0;
while x < 50 * n
• o X = [0, n ∗ 50− 1] o
sum := sum + x/n;
x := x + n;
x := x/n;
717
Consider a dynamic analysis that observes the maximal value assumed by x at program
point •. For every possible execution of program P we have that the maximal value assumed
by x at program point • is 49. Consider a state s ∈ Σ as a tuple 〈pp, [valx, valsum]〉, where
pp denotes the current program point, valx and valsum denote the current values of variables
x and sum respectively. We define a function τ : Σ→ N that observes the value assumed by
x at state s when s refers to program point •, and function max : Σ∗ → N that observes the
maximal value assumed by x at • along an execution trace:
τ(s) def=
{
valx if pp = •
∅ otherwise max(σ)
def= max({τ(s) | s ∈ σ})
This allows us to define the equivalence relation Amax ∈ Eq(Σ∗) that observes traces with718
respect to the maximal value assumed by x at •, as (σ, σ′) ∈ Amax iff max(σ) = max(σ′).719
We can observe that all the execution traces of P belong to the same equivalence class of720
Amax . In this case, a dynamic analysis of property Amax on P is sound whenever the test721
set contains at least one execution trace of P . This happens because the property that we722
are looking for is an invariant property of program executions and it can be observed on any723
execution trace.724
Let us now consider program Q equivalent to P , i.e., Den[[P ]] = Den[[Q]], where the725
value of x is diversified by multiplying it by the parameter n. The guard and the body726
of the while are adjusted in order to preserve the functionality of the program. When727
observing property Amax on Q, we have that the maximal value assumed by x at program728
point • is determined by the parameter n generated in the considered trace. The statement729
n:=select(N,x) assigns to n a value in the range [0, N ] depending on the input value x. We730
have that the traces of program Q are grouped by Amax depending on the value assumed by731
n. Thus, A([[Q]]) contains an equivalence class for every possible value assumed by n during732
execution. This means that the transformation that rewrites P into Q is potent according733
to Definition 6. Dynamic analysis of property Amax on program Q is sound if the test set734
contains at least one execution trace for each of the possible values of n generated during735
execution.736
5 Open research directions737
We have provided an unifying view of the relations between properties and program transfor-738
mations and the precision of static and dynamic analysis in the standard analysis scenario739
and in the software protection scenario. Researchers have proposed possible ways for tuning740
the precision of static analysis while less attention has been posed to the formal investigation741
of dynamic analysis. In this context it is worth to mention the recent work of O’Hearn [26]742
that defines a formalism called incorrectness logic, which is similar to Hoare’s logic, and743
allows us to prove the presence of bugs but not their absence, thus capturing the essence744
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of program testing. The incorrectness logic is based on a under-approximation triple that745
plays a dual role when compared to the standard over-approximation triple that we are746
used to see in Hoare’s logic. Indeed, while logic and symbolic reasoning are useful since747
they can cover many states or program paths at once, they do not allow in general to cover748
all paths and this makes it difficult to prove the absence of errors. The author claims the749
necessity and usefulness of incorrectness logic that formalises under-approximate reasoning750
in order to provide a logical proof of the presence of bugs. Such reasoning should of course751
be combined with standard correctness proof in order to obtain a global view of program’s752
runtime behaviour. The incorrectness logic of O’Hearn does not try to gain soundness,753
namely to avoid or reduce false negatives, but provides formal proofs for what can be derived754
in an unsound context. Our idea is to investigate the extent to which it is possible to induce755
or force soundness by modifying either the program, the property to be analysed or the756
coverage criterion. Once we have understood when and how soundness can be forced we757
should see how this interacts with incorrectness logic.758
The preliminary work done in the investigation of program and properties transformations759
towards sound dynamic analysis have pointed out many interesting aspects that need to be760
studied and that we list below as future research directions.761
The preliminary results that relate program properties, coverage criteria and the soundness762
of the analysis should be generalised and extended to properties that cannot be modelled763
as partitioning closures. Soundness of the analysis and transformation potency should764
be redefined probably in terms of join-irreducible elements instead of equivalence classes.765
This further investigation would probably lead to a classification of the properties usually766
considered by dynamic analysis based on the domain model needed to express them: properties767
of traces, properties of sets of traces, relational properties, hyper-properties. For each class768
of properties it would then be interesting to derive a suitable obfuscation strategy. This769
unifying framework would provide a common ground where to interpret and compare the770
potency of different software protection techniques in harming dynamic analysis.771
As regarding the transformation of properties towards soundness, we plan to verify if772
and when it is possible to refine the coverage criterion C in order to ensure soundness with773
respect to a given property A, or when it is possible to further abstract the semantic property774
A in order to make it sound for a given coverage criterion C. This should be done starting775
with properties that can be expressed as partitioning closures and then generalised to the776
other classes of properties.777
As regarding the transformation of programs towards soundness, it is important to778
investigate when it is possible to transform a program P for which the dynamic analysis of a779
given property A is sound (resp. unsound) into a different program P ′ which is functionally780
equivalent to P and for which the dynamic analysis of property A is unsound (resp. sound).781
It would also be important to extend the framework in order to take into account the782
feasibility of the considered coverage criterion, maybe defining some constraints that a783
program has to satisfy in order to guarantee the feasibility of a given coverage criterion, or784
by modelling and measuring situations when full coverage is not possible.785
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